The Bad Reichenhall ice-arena collapse and the necessary consequences for wide span timber structures

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Summary

At the beginning of the year 2006, on the 2nd of January, the ice-arena roof in Bad Reichenhall collapsed under the actual snow load. 15 people died, 30 were partly heavily injured. It was one of the biggest building collapses in the history of Germany after the last World War.

Two main expertises were ordered by the public prosecutor, one of it was prepared by the authors. The paper presents the main reasons for the collapse:

- Use of urea-formaldehyde glue under moist conditions
- Mistakes in the structure calculation – and no (required) evaluation of the calculations by a check engineer
- Divergence from the technical approval for this type of construction
- High snow load – but not exceeding the calculated snow load
- Non robust construction
- Lack of maintenance

In addition the collapse caused an intensive inspection of hundreds of existing wide span timber structures. The result shows an astonishing number of defects. Taking into account the statistical analysis of these inspections the paper ends with recommendations for further regular inspections and quality control of this type of structures. More information about the main detected defects and possibilities to avoid them are given in the additional paper of Phillip Dietsch, Arthur Wolfrum and Stefan Winter [3].

1. Introduction

The year 2006 started in Europe with some heavy building collapses. Due to an uncommon heavy winter season with snow e.g. in Bavaria from 18th of November until mid of April 2006 without interruption several types of buildings collapsed – from ordinary barns to wide span structures. Germany was mainly affected by the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena collapse (timber structure), but also in Poland an exhibition hall (steel structure) collapsed and people died. Austria and other neighbouring countries were also affected, but fortunately without injured or killed people.

The reasons for the collapse of the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena structure, which was not an ordinary glulam structure but a special box girder, are described below.
2. The collapse of the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena structure

After editing of the final reports a common press text was settled among the two expert teams (TU München and TÜV Süd) and the public prosecutor. In view of the ongoing legal proceedings this text is given below with some additional and explanatory pictures and some explanatory text given in [brackets].

“Assessments of the experts:

The reports submitted the main experts from the Technical University of Munich and TÜV-Süd are based on extensive investigations on site, directly following the occurrence of the damage, as well as follow-up inspections on secured building sections. The experts have, among others, extracted parts from the undamaged remaining structure and determined the characteristic strength properties of the individual components used.

In doing so, both main experts have largely reached the same results. In particular, it was consistently determined that the collapse of the roof structure of the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena is not due to a single cause, but rather, a series of several defects and damage.

In detail, the experts have reached the following findings:

1. Mode of construction

The Bad Reichenhall ice-arena, built in 1971/1972, was a structure of approx. 75 m in length and approx. 48 m in width. The roof was supported by 2.87 m high main girders, which were produced in timber construction as box-girders. It was a special type of construction. The box-girders were produced with upper girders and lower girders made of glulam and lateral web boards made in a so-called “Kämpf web board” [a type of X-lam], whereby the 48 m long girders were produced out of three 16 m long sections, which were joined with general finger joints. For the “Kämpf web-girder” type of construction, a general technical approval was available, which, however, limited the building height of the web-girders produced in this manner to 1.20 m [The production conditions allows only a height of the boards of 1.20 m].
Figure 3 Cross-section of the box-girders in the ice-arena (extracted from [1]): c-upper girder, d-lower-girder, h – Kämpf webboard, k-purlin, g-reinforcement (to avoid buckling)

Figure 4 Layout of the arena and side view of the girders (extracted from [1])
2. Deviation from the technical approval

With the ice-arena in Bad Reichenhall, significant regulations in the technical approval for the Kämpf web-girder construction were violated and the scope of experience at that time was abandoned. In particular, the maximum girder height of 1.20 m according to the approval was far exceeded in the construction of the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena, with a girder height of 2.87 m. An applied-for extension of the approval to the planned type of construction with box-girders without a height limit was not granted by the German Institute for Building Technology in 1971. Therefore, a so-called “Approval for an individual case” by the Supreme Building Authority of the Free State of Bavaria for executing the special structure would have been necessary. According to the findings to date, such an approval was not applied for by those involved in construction and was not available.

3. No checking of the static calculation

A structural calculation for the roof of the ice-arena examined by a check engineer was not able to be found so far, despite intensive research. Without such an examined structural calculation, the structure should not have been built. [In Germany the “four-eye-principle” is obligatory for the static calculation of special buildings, e.g. assembly or sport halls. The additional examination is done by so called “check-engineers”, experienced structural civil engineers which are appointed by the building authorities.]

4. No unusual snow load

The maximum snow load of 1.5 kN/sqm applied in the static calculation was not exceeded at the time of the accident. A calculatory excess stress on the basis of external load at the time of the collapse therefore did not exist, under the assumption of conventional structural safety margin and the building should therefore not have collapsed on the basis of the existing snow load.
5. **Errors in the structural calculation**

The review of the structural calculation that had not been examined, according to findings to date, resulted in two errors/omissions worth mentioning being present. The tensile strength in the centre of gravity of the glulam girders was not verified. Due to this, the load-bearing behaviour of the upper and lower girder was over-assessed. The weakening of the structure as a result of the finger-joints of girders and web-boards with general finger joints was also not taken into account in the structural calculation. The influence of moisture was disregarded. These errors and omissions resulted in a significant over-assessment of the static load-bearing behaviour of the roof box-girders. With this, the necessary structural safety margin of at least 2.0 did not exist.

The structural safety margin incorporates a possible exceeding of the load, the structural ageing and the negligible deviations in planning and production. Comparative calculations of the experts, based on the applicable technical rules at the time of the construction of the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena, have shown that the calculated safety factor at the time of building the arena, taking into account all general conditions and verifications, was only in the magnitude of around 1.5.

6. **Use of urea-formaldehyde (UF) - glue**

The main box-girders of the roof structure were mainly produced using a urea-formaldehyde glue. The use of this glue for load-bearing components was also only admissible in a dry ambient climate, according to the existing technical rules at that time.

According to the current state of knowledge, urea-formaldehyde glues are not suitable for bonding load-bearing components in ice-arenas, as they are not permanently moisture-proof. Unheated and non-air-conditioned ice-arenas represent a particularly critical climate for moisture-sensitive components. The relative humidity in such arenas is generally very high. Furthermore, the heat emission as a result of the thermal radiation between the roof structure and the ice surface leads to supercooling and therefore to increased formation of condensation on the underside of the roof structure facing the ice.

In Bad Reichenhall, there were also repeated cases of water penetration as a result of leaks in the roof membrane and in the area of the roof drainage. In contrasts, the experts agree that there were no disadvantageous effects from the subsequent enclosure of the arena, which was initially open on two sides.

The current findings regarding the critical humidity conditions in ice-arenas did not exist yet in 1972, so that the use of urea-resin glue for bonding the load-bearing components did not generally violate the state-of-the-art of technology at that time. However, even according to the technical rules at the time of construction, for the connections between the glulam-girders and Kämpf web-boards, instead of the brittle urea-formaldehyde glue, significantly more elastic resorcinol glue (RF) should have been used, due to the thick bonding gaps.

Through the humidity exposure over the years in the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena, the glue-lines carried out with urea-formaldehyde glues cause significant damage to the roof structure. This primarily affected the general finger joints on the lower girders and the bonding between the girders and the web-boards. On the general finger joint of the lower girders, there was so much damage to the glue in some cases, that it had lost its adhesive effect to a depth of 50 mm to 80 mm.

The humidity-related damage to the glue lines in the roof structure represents a significant cause for the collapse of the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena.

7. **Defects in the structure of the main supports**

The production process for the box-girder cross sections of the main girders by means of block gluing between girders and web-boards did not correspond to the recognised rules of
technology at the time [gluing secured by nails was and is limited to a board thickness of max. 35 – 50 mm]. The production of the vertical general finger joints of the web-boards must also be regarded as difficult and not very robust. The quality of the glue lines in these finger joints of the webs differed. In addition to this was prior damage to the large-format web-boards due to changing humidity exposure. These structural defects were involved in causing the collapse of the arena.
8. **Concrete support structure**

In contrast, the existing subsidence of the concrete support structure of the ice-arena, which amounts to approx. 100 mm along the southern row of foundations on from the east-to-west side, are not regarded as being relevant to the damage. The resulting deformation of the roof structure itself is so minor that on the basis of plausibility comparisons and comparative calculations, additional forced stress on the roof structure cannot be concluded.

9. **Maintenance**

With respect to the maintenance of the building, it is determined that the causes of repeated water penetration into the ice-arena (leaks in the roof membrane) were not permanently rectified and the wooden roof structure did not receive renovation paint during the use of the arena.

Whether such measures would have significantly delayed the damage to the glue lines of the roof structure, cannot be answered at this time with sufficient certainty.

A professional examination of the structural integrity of the roof structure is not documented. With this, it should have been taken into account that it involved a special structure. Furthermore, even years ago, indications must already have existed of damage to the glue lines between glulam-girders and web-boards, as well as to the general finger joints of the lower girders and the general finger joints of the web-boards. For a professional, this should have given rise to a more detailed examination of the condition of the roof structure and the related technical documentation.

![Figure 8 Damaged glulam-girder to web-board glue line](image)

**Summary**

In summary, the causes of the collapse are to be described as follows:

The structural safety margin at significantly below 2.0 as a result of errors in the static calculation and structural defects, was constantly further reduced over the period of the building’s service life due to external influences, particularly the deterioration of the general
finger joints and glue lines on the lower girders, until the collapse of the arena took place on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} January 2006, triggered by the snow load.

According to the findings of the experts, one of the three main box-girders on the east side failed first. Due to the stiff cross girders, the loads were shifted from the box-girder that failed first to the neighbouring girders. These box-girders, which were already pre-damaged were also overloaded, due to which the entire roof collapsed like a zipper.”

3. Results and necessary consequences

In the case of the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena a so-called progressive collapse behaviour appeared, i.e. the failure of an individual main support led to the chain-reaction collapse of the entire arena roof structure, through the very stiff cross girder structure.

Regarding the collapse of the ice-arena in Bad Reichenhall, it must particularly be emphasised that it involves a special type of construction, which can in no way be compared to conventional wide span glulam structures.

With the investigation of a wide range of different arena structure, a number of additional significant causes of damage emerged [3]. Taking this and the Bad Reichenhall ice-arena collapse in account, the following consequences should be observed:

- No urea-formaldehyde glues should be used furthermore for wide-span structures. It is impossible to have knowledge about the use of the building during its whole life-time and - in conjunction with this - unknown moisture conditions could appear. Only moisture resistant glues shall be used. The results of Raknes’ research [2] have been proved.
- Especially partly open ice-sport arenas with uninsulated roofs are exposed to permanent and high moisture changes. Closed structures and moderate heating or air-conditioning lead to much better climate conditions.
- Box-girders lead to cavities which are impossible to control – they should be avoided.
- Investigate failure mode of wide span structures.
- The “four-eye-principle” should be practiced, especially for wide span structures.
- Regular inspection and maintenance of wide span structures should be obligatory (not only for timber structures). Buildings and their structures are ageing like all other types of technical systems!!!
- Do not extend the scope of technical approvals without further investigations
- Quality control is an outstanding and essential necessity from planning to erection and maintenance for all types of wide span structures – time goes by, rubbish remains!

References

